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I. INTRODUCTION 
Each year about eleven million Americans have their wages garnished.1  
The wages of these workers are reduced, on average, by over $2,000 each 
year even though those most likely to be garnished only earn between 
$25,000 and $40,000 annually.2  In comparison, about two million workers 
earn the minimum wage or below3 and about 85,000 discrimination charges 
are filed with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) every year.4  And yet the newspapers are filled with debates about 
the minimum wage and discrimination with only the occasional mention of 
garnishment.5  Ditto the academic literature.6 
This Article is about wage garnishment, primarily garnishment for 
consumer debt.7  Wage garnishment is a massive, largely unexplored part of 
the civil justice system.  The laws are archaic, inefficient, and exceptionally 
complex.  Workers and employers are unwilling participants in the process, 
and generally unfamiliar with their rights and responsibilities.  The costs of 
the system are unnecessarily high.  And yet, again, little attention is paid to 
 
 1  A study conducted by ADP found that 7.2% of employees had their wages garnished 
in 2013.  ADP RESEARCH INST., GARNISHMENT: THE UNTOLD STORY 8 (2014), 
https://www.adp.com/tools-and-resources/adp-research-institute/insights/~/media/RI/pdf/ 
Garnishment-whitepaper.ashx.  The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that about 128 million 
people were non-agricultural wage and salary workers in 2013.  See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 2013 ANNUAL AVERAGES: HOUSEHOLD DATA tbl. 21 
(2013), https://www.bls.gov/cps/cps_aa2013.htm (excludes self-employed workers working 
for unincorporated entities and unpaid family members).  This means that about nine million 
employees had their wages garnished in 2013.  These numbers are relatively consistent over 
time.  See ADP RESEARCH INST., supra, at 1.  
 2  See ADP RESEARCH INST., supra note 1, at 12; see also Steven L. Willborn, Indirect 
Threats to the Wages of Low-Income Workers: Garnishment and Payday Loans, 45 STETSON 
L. REV. 35, 37–38 (2015) (estimating, in different ways that the wages of “between five and 
eleven million workers” are garnished each year).  
 3  U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CHARACTERISTICS OF 
MINIMUM WAGE WORKERS, 2017, REPORT NO. 1072 (2018), 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/minimum-wage/2017/pdf/home.pdf (reporting that “1.8 
million workers [earned] wages at or below the federal minimum”).  
 4  Charge Statistics (Charges Filed with the EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 2017, U.S. 
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ 
charges.cfm (last visited Jan. 17, 2019) (reporting annual charges ranging from 75,000 to 
100,000, with an average of 86,000).  
 5  In 2017, Westlaw’s “Journals Magazines and Newsletters” database contained 917 
articles with the words “minimum wage” in the title and 2,563 articles with the word 
“discrimination” in the title.  The word “garnishment” appeared in the title to 44 articles.  
 6  See infra notes 9–10. 
 7  Child support is the leading reason for wage garnishment.  See ADP RESEARCH INST., 
supra note 1, at 8 (about half of wage garnishments are for child support and about forty 
percent for debt); see also Paul Kiel, Unseen Toll: Wages of Millions Seized to Pay Past 
Debts, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 15, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/article/unseen-toll-wages-
of-millions-seized-to-pay-past-debts (about four million workers had wages garnished for 
debt in 2013).  
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the issue. 
This Article will begin with a general overview of wage garnishment. 
Part II will consider why wage garnishment receives so little public attention; 
Part III will briefly review its history; and Part IV will present the general 
structure of wage garnishment.  In Part V, the Article will drill down more 
deeply into the garnishment process, and explore the many ways in which it 
is unfair and inefficient.  This Part will look to a recent product of the 
Uniform Law Commission, the Uniform Wage Garnishment Act (UWGA),8 
to suggest ways in which the process could be made more fair and efficient. 
II. GARNISHMENT NEGLECT 
Garnishment is a mass justice system affecting the wages of millions of 
workers every year.  And yet it is largely invisible on the legal horizon.  Since 
2010, for example, eight articles have been published in law journals with 
the word “garnishment” in the title.9  By comparison, over 1,200 articles 
have been published since 2010 with the word “discrimination” in the title.10  
What explains this lack of interest in garnishment?  Let us count the ways. 
First, garnishment is old and state-based. As discussed below,11 
garnishment arose organically with the rise of capitalism and wage labor.  
Until recently, there has never been an effort to harmonize the law across 
states,12 and federal regulation came late and was minimal.13  In contrast, 
most other major labor initiatives during the New Deal14 and later15 attracted 
much more attention because they were all national in scope and, in large 
part because of that, enacted after major public and legislative efforts.16 
 
 8  See generally UNIF. WAGE GARNISHMENT ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2016). 
 9  Search conducted in Westlaw’s “Law Reviews & Journals” database on May 15, 2018.  
Only thirty-four articles had the word “garnishment” anywhere in them since 2010. 
 10  The search conducted in Westlaw’s “Law Reviews & Journals” database on May 15, 
2018, produced 1,270 articles.  A search in the same database for the word “discrimination” 
anywhere in an article produced more than 10,000 articles (the search terminates at 10,000 
articles). 
 11  See infra Part III. 
 12  To the author’s knowledge, the UWGA was the first effort to harmonize wage 
garnishment law across states. 
 13  See infra Parts III–IV.  
 14  The major labor initiatives during the New Deal were the federal National Labor 
Relations Act and Fair Labor Standards Act and the hybrid state/federal unemployment 
programs.  See Chapter 3: The Department in the New Deal and World War II 1933-1945, 
U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/history/dolchp03 (last visited Jan. 
19, 2019). 
 15  In the 1960s, the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act began a period 
of federal enactments that continues to today.  See STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 3–4 (6th ed. 2017). 
 16  For good reviews of the major efforts undertaken to enact federal employment laws, 
see, for example, CHARLES W. WHALEN JR. & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A 
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Second, garnishment is complicated.  One reason for this is that it does 
not fit neatly into one legal category.  Garnishment is employment law, 
broadly construed, as it regulates the relationship between employer and 
employee.  But it is also collection law as it structures the relationship 
between creditor and debtor.  These legal regimes mesh only imperfectly 
making the topic complicated and technical. 
Third, garnishment tends to affect a class of people who are largely out 
of the public eye and not overly sympathetic.  Unlike the minimum wage, 
for example, garnishment is not focused on the poorest among us; creditors 
are interested in garnishing the wages only of people who have wages high 
enough to yield returns.17  On the other end of the economic spectrum, 
garnishment does not tend to affect friends and colleagues of those who 
might write about the topic.  Law professors, for example, will know people 
who have experienced discrimination (or will have experienced it 
themselves); they are much less likely to know people whose wages have 
been garnished.18  And, of course, the people who are adversely affected by 
garnishment are people who by definition have not paid their debts. 
Finally, garnishment is just not a very sexy topic.  The issues that arise 
in garnishment tend to be small-scale and technocratic—what notice needs 
to be provided, how does one calculate limits on the amount that can be 
garnished, etc.  These issues simply do not compare on the human-interest 
scale to the problems of the working poor addressed by the minimum wage 
or the often dramatic story lines of major discrimination cases. 
This Article is a modest reaction to this unfortunate garnishment 
neglect.  As noted, garnishment affects millions of people each year.  Given 
these large numbers, small gains in efficiency could yield large benefits to 
be shared by everyone in the system, but which would accrue mostly to 
workers who bear most of the costs of the current system.  Major 
improvements could also be made in fairness, for example, by providing 
employees with comprehensible notices and automatic protections rather 
than ones that need to be claimed.  But to achieve these gains, garnishment 
must be brought out of the shadows. 
 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985); Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a Minimum Wage, 101 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 
22 (1978).  
 17  ADP RESEARCH INST., supra note 1, at 12 (finding that the garnishment rate for those 
making less than $7,500 per year was 2.4%, while the rates for all other income brackets less 
than $200,000 per year ranged from 3.0 to 10.0%).  
 18  Id. (finding that the garnishment rate for those making more than $200,000 per year 
was 1.8% compared to rates ranging from 2.4% to 10.0% for all other income brackets).  
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III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF GARNISHMENT 
Garnishment has deep historical roots,19 but wage garnishment first 
arose in the United States during the transition to an industrial economy.20  
Nebraska is typical.21  Wage garnishment is included within Nebraska’s 
general collection statute, which was first enacted in 1867.22  Although 
wages were always subject to garnishment, they were first included 
explicitly in the statute in 1972 when the Unicameral enacted a major bill to 
create a system of county courts to replace an older system which included 
police magistrates and justices of the peace as well as county courts.23  The 
general rule in the 1972 statute, still in place, applied a typical attachment 
approach to wages.  That is, the employer begins to withhold wages as soon 
as the garnishment notice is served, but awaits a further court order with 
instructions for what to do with the money.24  The only other major change 
to Nebraska’s wage garnishment statute was made in 1988, when continuing 
garnishments were first statutorily authorized.25  At base, Nebraska’s wage 
garnishment statute, like most, is ancient, cobbled together, and highly 
inefficient.26 
 
 19  See William E. Mussman & Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Garnishment and Bankruptcy, 27 
MINN. L. REV. 1, 7–17 (1942) (tracing the origins of garnishment back to the concept of 
“foreign attachment” in the Middle Ages).  
 20  See Joseph C. Sweeney, Abolition of Wage Garnishment, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 197, 
202 (1969) (“[W]age garnishment and the exemptions therefrom are a product of the modern 
industrial age . . . .” (footnote omitted)).  Consistent with this, it is interesting to note that 
wage garnishment statutes closely followed the abolition of debtors’ prisons.  See Boyd v. 
Buckingham & Co., 29 Tenn. (10 Hum.) 434, 435 (1850) (“[W]hen it is remembered that the 
right to imprison the debtor had been abolished by the act of 1842, . . . only one year before 
the passage of the attachment law under consideration, the object of the legislature in changing 
the attachment law, will plainly appear.”). 
 21  See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-1056 (West 2018).  For examples of other state 
garnishment statutes that can be traced back to the beginnings of the industrial age, see ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 16-66-208 (West 2018) (statutory credits begin in 1875); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
77.0305 (West 2018) (1845); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 11-201 (West 2018) (1881); 9 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. § 9-26-4 (West 2018) (1905).  See generally Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 
104–07 (1921) (statute in Delaware and other states date from early colonial times); Mussman 
& Riesenfeld, supra note 19, at 7–17 (same).  
 22  R.S. 1867, Code § 244, p. 433.  
 23  1972 Neb. Laws 1032, § 127.  
 24  NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-1056(1) (West 2018) (“When wages are involved, the 
garnishee [employer] shall pay to the employee all disposable earnings exempted from 
garnishment by statute, and any disposable earnings remaining after such payment shall be 
retained by the garnishee until further order of the court.”). 
 25  1988 Neb. Laws 1030, § 17. 
 26  Garnishment for child support provides an instructive counter-example.  With 
prodding from the federal government, since 2012 every state has updated and modernized 
their system for collecting child support by enacting the Uniform Interstate Family Support 
Act (UIFSA) (amended 2008), 9 pt. 1B U.L.A. 148–49 (2015) (listing states and dates of 
enactment). 
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The modern history of garnishment begins in 1968 with enactment of 
the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA).27  The CCPA did two 
basic things.  First, it provided a floor of protection to ensure that debtors 
could survive even though they were subject to garnishment.  The floor was 
low.  Wages were not subject to garnishment at all until weekly earnings 
exceeded thirty times the federal minimum wage,28 and they could never 
exceed more than twenty-five percent of earnings.29  Second, the CCPA 
provided a similarly modest protection against discharge for garnishment.  
An employer could not discharge a worker whose wages had been garnished 
only once.30 
The CCPA contains an anti-preemption provision that preserves state 
laws that are more protective of employees.31 This ensures a level of diversity 
(and chaos) between states.  A few states outright prohibit wage garnishment 
for debt32 (although even they generally grant full faith and credit to 
garnishments coming from other states),33 and most provide a higher level of 
protection than the CCPA in one or more ways, such as protecting higher 
multiples of the federal minimum wage, multiples of a higher state minimum 
wage, or a higher percentage of wages.34 
 
 27  Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671–77 (2018)).  Professor 
Budnitz attributes this surge of interest in consumer protection to President Johnson’s War on 
Poverty and, more specifically, to establishment of the Legal Services Program which, at the 
beginning, had an explicit law reform agenda.  Mark E. Budnitz, The Development of 
Consumer Protection Law, the Institutionalization of Consumerism, and Future Prospects 
and Perils, 26 GA. ST. L. REV. 1147, 1151–53 (2010).  
 28  Thus, with the federal minimum wage currently at $7.25 per hour, no earnings can be 
garnished until a worker’s weekly earnings exceed thirty times $7.25, or $217.50 per week.  
See Minimum Wage, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/wages/minimum 
wage (last visited Apr. 15, 2019). 
 29  See 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a).  These are the limits for wage garnishment; the restrictions 
do not apply in some circumstances and are weaker for support payments.  See id. § 1673(b).  
These restrictions apply to “disposable earnings” rather than wages.  Disposable earnings 
exclude a portion of a worker’s wages from garnishment (such as required taxes), so the 
UWGA provides effective protection for more than thirty times the federal minimum wage 
and twenty-five percent of gross wages.  See § 1672(b). 
 30  See id. § 1674.  
 31  See id. § 1677.  This anti-preemption provision is similar to those in other labor laws, 
which permit states to provide stronger protections for employees.  See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 218 
(2018) (authorizing more protective state laws relating to the minimum wage, overtime, and 
child labor); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (2018) (authorizing more protective state discrimination 
laws).  
 32  See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 28; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-362 (West 2018); 42 PA. 
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8127 (West 2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-5-104 (2018); see 
also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 512:21 (West 2018) (prohibiting continuing wage garnishments, 
which means that wages earned after service of garnishment order are exempt).  
 33  See Knighton v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 856 S.W.2d 206, 210 (Tex. App. 1993).  
 34  For a chart listing the levels of protection in each state, see AMORETTE NELSON 
BRYANT, COMPLETE GUIDE TO FEDERAL AND STATE GARNISHMENT 9-40 to 9-45 (2015 ed. 
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Even if the CCPA had not had the anti-preemption provision, it would 
have had only a modest effect in updating and modernizing wage 
garnishment.  The CCPA had no provisions at all on the wide range of other 
important components of a wage garnishment system, such as how 
garnishment starts (as a new case or as part of the underlying debt action), 
the notice provided to the debtor, how the money flows, when garnishment 
ends, and many others.  As a result, garnishment in the United States is not 
only old, it is tired and inefficient within each state.  It also varies 
considerably across states. 
IV. WAGE GARNISHMENT WRIT LARGE 
Wage garnishment intermediates between two relationships.  First, 
wage garnishment requires a creditor and a debtor.  Although there are some 
exceptions, garnishment generally occurs only after a creditor has a court 
judgment against a debtor to recover a debt.35  Second, wage garnishment 
requires an employer and an employee.  Although garnishment is a broader 
term, wage garnishment occurs only when an employer owes money to an 
employee.  Wage garnishment is the process that permits a creditor to seek 
payment for a debt from an employer that owes wages to an employee/
debtor. 
Viewed from 10,000 feet in this way, wage garnishment is primarily a 
process for connecting these two relationships.  This connection raises many 
interesting questions, only some of which are regularly addressed.  This 
Article is mostly about fairness and efficiency within the internal workings 
of the garnishment process, but we should at least nod to some of the broader 
issues presented by a wage garnishment system. 
For example, why do creditors have this collection option at all?  
Interestingly, when the CCPA was enacted in 1968, the possibility of a 
national prohibition on wage garnishment was seriously considered as a 
measure to protect worker wages.36  Ultimately, however, this prohibition 
was rejected because it would unduly restrict “honest and ethical creditors, 
while permitting those fully capable of paying just debts to escape such 
responsibilities.”37  There was also concern that eliminating wage 
garnishment would make it difficult for people to borrow money; creditors 
would be less likely to extend credit if it was too difficult to collect.  
 
2014). 
 35  Minnesota permits pre-judgment wage garnishment in narrowly defined 
circumstances, such as a debtor attempt to hide assets to defraud a creditor.  MINN. STAT. § 
571.93 (2018). 
 36  H.R. REP. NO. 90-1040 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1962, 1978, 1967 WL 
4174 (original House “bill would have provided for a blanket prohibition against the 
garnishment of wages”).  
 37  Id.  
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Moreover, if prohibiting wage garnishment did have this effect, it would hit 
low-income workers the hardest.38 
The option of eliminating wage garnishment was rejected because of 
these concerns in favor of the narrower measures that are still in place to 
protect workers from the worst effects of wage garnishment (destitution and 
unemployment).  But it is unclear that the arguments should carry the day, 
then or now.  Four states have largely eliminated wage garnishment39 without 
any apparent decrease in the ability of people in those states to access credit.  
This may be because the worry about limiting access to credit was always 
misplaced, or it could be because the credit market has expanded and evolved 
since then in ways that avoid these effects.40  Regardless, this broader 
discussion about the importance of wage garnishment to credit markets 
seems to have largely disappeared from political discourse. 
Second, what effect does garnishment have on employment?  For an 
employee, a wage garnishment is equivalent to a wage reduction of up to 
twenty-five percent.41  How might an employee react?  One option might be 
to move to another job; even a lower-paying job may be better monetarily if 
twenty-five percent of the wages are not skimmed off the top.42  Another 
 
 38  This concern was documented by studies that were authorized by the CCPA.  See Pub. 
L. No. 90-321, §§ 401–407, 82 Stat. 146, 166 (1968) (authorizing establishment of the 
National Commission on Consumer Finance); see also William C. Dunkelberg & Robert 
Smiley, An Analysis of the Impact of Rate Regulation in the Consumer Credit Industry, in 6 
TECHNICAL STUDIES OF THE NAT’L COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FIN. 3–28 (1974) (restrictions 
on consumer credit would harm consumers, especially low-income families); Douglas F. 
Greer, Creditors’ Remedies and Contract Provisions: An Economic and Legal Analysis of 
Consumer Credit Collection, in 5 TECHNICAL STUDIES OF THE NAT’L COMMISSION ON 
CONSUMER FIN. 85–160 (1973) (if garnishment is restricted, creditors will tighten eligibility 
standards, which will affect all consumers but especially the poor and least credit worthy). 
 39  See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 28; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-362 (West 2018); 42 PA. 
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8127 (West 2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-5-104 (2018); see 
also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 512:21 (West 2018) (prohibiting continuing wage garnishments, 
which means that wages earned after service of garnishment order are exempt).  
 40  Several factors resulted in a sea change in consumer credit since enactment of the 
CCPA, including technological advances in data processing and telecommunications, 
financial deregulation, improvements in the ability to segment consumers based on credit-
worthiness, and increased ability to securitize debt.  One indicator of this sea change is that 
the percentage of families holding a general-purpose credit card increased from sixteen 
percent in 1970 to seventy-one percent in 2004.  See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE 
SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON PRACTICES OF THE CONSUMER CREDIT INDUSTRY IN 
SOLICITING AND EXTENDING CREDIT AND THEIR EFFECTS ON CONSUMER DEBT AND 
INSOLVENCY 3–12 (2006).  
 41  See 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a)(1) (2018) (permitting no more than twenty-five percent of 
disposable earnings to be garnished).  States may, however, impose greater restrictions on the 
maximum amount of wages that can be garnished, and many states do.  See id. § 1677 
(providing that this provision “does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any person from 
complying with, the laws of any State . . . .”). 
 42  Data on the incidence of employees quitting to avoid garnishment is thin.  See C. 
Kenneth Grosse & Charles W. Lean, Wage Garnishment in Washington—An Empirical Study, 
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option might be to declare bankruptcy to try to wipe out the debt; although 
one would think garnishment might increase bankruptcies, evidence on the 
connection is mixed.43  Finally, if efficiency wage theory is correct (that 
employees work harder when they are paid more),44 garnishment may result 
in more shirking and, hence, less productivity for employers.  All of these 
employee-relations considerations are murky and poorly explored; none play 
a conspicuous role in modern discussions about wage garnishment. 
V. THE FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY OF THE WAGE GARNISHMENT PROCESS 
The fairness and efficiency of the modern wage garnishment system is 
the focus of this Article.  Because wage garnishment is a state-based system, 
it varies considerably across the country.  But every system must have certain 
features: the process must be started, employees must be notified, money 
must be transferred, etc. 
The Uniform Law Commission recently promulgated the UWGA, 
which is the first comprehensive attempt to address fairness and efficiency 
in the wage garnishment process.45  This analysis will follow the outline of 
that law.  But first a word about fairness and efficiency. 
 
43 WASH. L. REV. 743, 750 n.46 (1968) (indicating that fifty-six percent of employers said 
that employees had quit when their wages were garnished and thirty-eight percent said that 
none had quit).  
 43  Compare TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY 
AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 305 (1999) (less than ten percent of bankruptcies were 
preceded by a property seizure or garnishment; about four percent of creditors in bankruptcy 
had filed a collection suit prior to bankruptcy), and Richard M. Hynes, Bankruptcy and State 
Collections: The Case of the Missing Garnishments, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 634 (2006) 
(few garnishments are followed by bankruptcy), with DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, 
BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 29–32 (1971) (finding that bankruptcy filing rates 
are higher in states with stricter garnishment laws).  Ironically, one of the reasons for 
exemptions in garnishment is to permit the employee to retain sufficient compensation to 
avoid the necessity of bankruptcy.  Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974).  The issue 
is complicated because while garnishment may (or may not) result in more bankruptcies, it is 
also possible that the absence of the ability to garnish may lead to what is known as “informal 
bankruptcy,” which is simply the failure to pay debts.  See Sumit Agarwal et al., Exemption 
Laws and Consumer Delinquency and Bankruptcy Behavior: An Empirical Analysis of Credit 
Card Data, 43 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 273, 278 (2002) (more garnishment protections and 
higher cost of bankruptcy leads to higher rate of informal bankruptcy); Amanda E. Dawsey 
& Lawrence M. Ausubel, Informal Bankruptcy 8 (Jan. 26, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.ausubel.com/creditcard-papers/informal-bankruptcy-jan2001.pdf (explaining 
that the unavailability of wage garnishment in some states leads to an increase in the rate of 
informal bankruptcy).  
 44  For classic descriptions of efficiency wage theory, see TRUMAN F. BEWLEY, WHY 
WAGES DON’T FALL DURING A RECESSION 126–27 (1999); George A. Akerlof, Labor 
Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange, 97 Q.J. ECON. 543 (1982); Carl Shapiro & Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 433 
(1984).  
 45  See generally UNIF. WAGE GARNISHMENT ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2016).  
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Current wage garnishment fails badly on both counts.  On fairness, as 
will be explained in more detail below,46 all three parties have something to 
complain about.  For the employee/debtor, the standard notice in most states 
is legalistic and convoluted.  It certainly is not designed to be understood by 
the typical employee/debtor.  For employers, the process can be convoluted 
and time-consuming and, if they fail in some respect, the penalties can be 
draconian. For creditors, the payment system often includes unnecessary 
delays. 
The current system also fails badly on efficiency.  Few state systems 
take full advantage of modern payment systems, and exemption rules often 
require court hearings burdensome to courts and all the parties.  The forms 
used by the states tend to be complicated and incompatible with modern 
technology. 
To explore these issues in more detail, this Article will track the process 
as proposed by the UWGA.  The UWGA was designed to address the 
fairness and efficiency shortcomings of the current system, so tracking it 
sheds light on the problems and suggests solutions to them. 
A. Who is Covered? 
Garnishment statutes facilitate garnishment of wages.  Somewhat 
counterintuitively, however, workers may be better off when they are 
covered by the statutes.  If they are covered, the limits on garnishment apply.  
If not, those worker protections are unavailable.  For example, in Idaho 
Pacific Lumber Company, Inc. v. Celestial Land Company Limited,47 the 
court held that the limits on garnishment did not apply to a debtor who was 
an independent contractor, rather than an employee.  As a result, the creditor 
was entitled to the entire $45,000 the garnishee owed to the debtor/
independent contractor.48  If the debtor had been an employee instead, the 
creditor would have been entitled to only $11,250, twenty-five percent of the 
wages owed; the debtor would have been able to retain $33,750.49  This issue 
has become increasingly important in recent years as new forms of work 
have blurred the line between employee and independent contractor50 and, 
 
 46  See infra Part V.C–E. 
 47  348 P.3d 950 (Colo. App. 2013). 
 48  Id. at 955. 
 49  This case caused Colorado to extend its garnishment protections to independent 
contractors.  See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-54.5-101(2)(a)(i) (West 2018).  The amendment 
to extend Colorado’s garnishment protections to independent contractors, however, was a 
crude and hurried attempt.  The amendment does not provide any guidance about which 
independent contractors might be covered, nor does it deal with any of the special problems 
of covering independent contractors. 
 50  See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 
(denying summary judgment on issue of whether Uber drivers were employees or independent 
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relatedly, as some employers have acted aggressively to move workers into 
the independent-contractor category.51 
In most states, this issue is unresolved.  Some states have held that the 
protections of garnishment statutes apply only to employees.52  Other states 
have applied garnishment protections to independent contractors.  After 
Idaho Pacific, Colorado did this by statute.53  A few states have done it 
through interpretation of their particular garnishment statutes; the general 
theory is that the protections should apply if the monies were earned through 
“personal services,” regardless of the employee status of the debtor.54  The 
decisions extending garnishment protections to non-employees do not 
provide much guidance on the special problems created by the extension. 
The UWGA applies to traditional employees and extends its protections 
to a defined class of independent contractors.  Independent contractors are 
covered if they are individuals who perform personal services and are paid 
periodically.55  Extending the UWGA’s coverage to this subset of 
independent contractors serves three functions.  First, it provides the 
UWGA’s protections to individuals who look a lot like employees, but who 
are not treated as such by their employers through misclassification or 
design.56  Second, it permits these types of workers (and their “employers”) 
to enjoy the efficiencies from the new and better procedures provided by the 
UWGA.  Third, it ensures that the UWGA is at least as protective as the 
 
contractors). 
 51  In a recent high-profile example, FedEx re-arranged its relationship with delivery 
drivers in an attempt to convert them from “employees” to “independent contractors.”  The 
courts have been split on whether FedEx was successful in this re-classification effort.  
Compare Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 1033, 1049 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(holding that the drivers were employees and, therefore, entitled to overtime premiums), with 
FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that the drivers 
were independent contractors and, therefore, not able to unionize under the NLRA); see also 
Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 42 (Cal. 2018) (rejecting the 
company’s attempt to reclassify its drivers as independent contractors).  
 52  See, e.g., In re Schlein, 8 F.3d 745 (11th Cir. 1993); Coward v. Smith, 636 P.2d 793, 
797 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (amount due to an independent contractor under a construction 
contract were not earnings); In re Galvez, 990 P.2d 187, 190 (Nev. 1999) (real estate 
commission earned by independent contractor was not earnings under state garnishment law), 
superseded by statute, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21.090 (West 2018); SunTrust Bank v. Burke, 
491 S.W.3d 693 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015); Olson v. Townsend, 530 A.2d 566 (Vt. 1987); cf. 
Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 652 (1974) (income tax refund is not entitled to the 
protections of the federal CCPA).  
 53  See § 13-54.5-101(2)(a)(i). 
 54  See Cal.-Peterson Currency Exch. v. Friedman, 736 N.E.2d 616 (Ill. Ct. App. 2000); 
In re Sexton, 140 B.R. 742 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1992); In re Duncan, 140 B.R. 210 (Bankr. 
E.D. Tenn. 1992); cf. In re Pruss, 235 B.R. 430, 436 (Bankr. 8th Cir.), vacated, 255 B.R. 314 
(Bankr. 8th Cir.) (mem.) (lawyer’s accounts receivable were protected by garnishment 
exemptions). 
 55  UNIF. WAGE GARNISHMENT ACT § 2(6)(B) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2016). 
 56  See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
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CCPA, as required by the CCPA.  The CCPA does not reference 
“employees” and “employers,” but rather simply protects earnings from 
personal services.57 
B. Beginning the Process 
States provide two distinct ways for the wage garnishment process to 
commence; some states begin the process as a part of the underlying action 
on the debt against the employee, while in other states the garnishment action 
is a new proceeding.  In states in which the garnishment is a new proceeding, 
the action is filed against the employer demanding that it withhold the wages 
of one of its employees.  As a result, jurisdiction is based on whether the 
employer is subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum even though the 
employee may have minimal contacts there.  For example, in Nagel v. 
Westen,58 the court permitted a garnishment action to proceed in Minnesota 
even though the debtors/employees were located in Texas.  More generally, 
in theory, creditors could forum-shop by suing national corporations in fora 
favorable to the creditor even though the employee has minimal contacts 
there.59  The UWGA addresses this issue by generally requiring that 
garnishment actions be filed in the employee’s principal place of work at the 
time the action is commenced.60 
 
 57  As noted above, some states interpret the CCPA to provide protections to some 
independent contractors. See supra notes 53–54.  If those interpretations are correct, then the 
CCPA would require state law to cover them as state law cannot provide narrower protections 
than the CCPA.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1677(1) (2018).  
 58  865 N.W.2d 325 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015).  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 68 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).  
 59  Due process considerations impose some constraints on creditor ability to shop for 
favorable fora.  See Nagel, 865 N.W.2d at 335–40 (considering whether a non-resident, post-
judgment debtor had sufficient contacts with the state to support a garnishment action based 
only on property within the state).  
 60  UNIF. WAGE GARNISHMENT ACT § 4.  A comment to the section explains that the 
“‘when the action is commenced’ language signals that, if an employee is in State A when the 
action is filed there and is then transferred by the employer to State B, the garnishment action 
may continue in State A.”  Id. § 4 cmt. at 9.  The comment notes that 
[t]his is in mild conflict with the policy that the state where the employee 
works is the one whose limits and exemptions should apply because in 
this situation the court in State A will be applying State A’s limits and 
exemptions even though the employee is now in State B. 
Id.  But the UWGA accepted that limitation because 
the alternatives are inefficient and avoiding the inefficiencies outweighs 
this state-interest concern.  The inefficient alternatives are (1) to require 
the court in State A to dismiss the garnishment at the time of the transfer 
and force the creditor to file a new action in State B or (2) to require the 
court in State A to have a hearing to begin to apply State B’s limits and 
exemptions at the time of the transfer. 
Id. 
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Proper service on the employer is a recurrent problem in commencing 
a wage garnishment action, regardless of whether the action is a new one or 
a continuation of the underlying debt action against the employee.  Without 
direction, service might be made on an improper representative of the 
employer, for example, on a supervisor at the branch store where the 
employee works.  This is a problem because it may delay the process while 
the company gets the summons into the hands of the proper executive (and, 
often, subsequently into the hands of an outside payroll processing firm).  
The UWGA handles this issue by requiring that the process start with service 
on the employer’s registered agent, if there is one.61 
Properly identifying the debtor is another common problem in 
garnishment.  This problem may be especially acute when garnishment 
extends to individuals whom the employer identifies as independent 
contractors.62  The employer may not have as much identifying information 
for these individuals as it has for regular employees.  The UWGA addresses 
this issue by requiring the creditor to provide date-of-birth and social security 
information through a non-public procedure that protects confidentiality.63 
C. Notice 
Regardless of how the garnishment action is commenced, the employer 
and employee must receive notice that tells them about the process and their 
rights and obligations.64 
Because garnishment is mass justice with millions of cases each year, 
every state provides notice forms.  The notice forms for employees vary from 
state to state, but they are similar in their legalistic approach.  They tend to 
focus on legalistic accuracy, using terms of art such as “summons” and 
“judgment creditor,” rather than on the ability of employees to understand 
what is going on.  The current state notice forms also tend to fail on a variety 
 
 61  Id. § 5(b).  
 62  See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
 63  UNIF. WAGE GARNISHMENT ACT § 5(d).  
 64  The United States Supreme Court once held that due process did not require notice to 
debtors in a post-judgment wage garnishment action.  See Endicott-Johnson Corp. v. 
Encyclopedia Press, 266 U.S. 285, 289–90 (1924).  The theory was that debtors had already 
received all the process they were due in the underlying action upon which the wage 
garnishment was based.  Id.  But much has changed since then.  In 1969, the Supreme Court, 
without mentioning Endicott-Johnson, held that due process required adequate notice before 
wages could be garnished in a pre-judgment proceeding.  See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 
395 U.S. 337, 341–42 (1969).  Since then, a long line of lower-court cases has held that 
debtors in wage garnishment actions are constitutionally entitled to notice of exemptions and 
the procedures for enforcing them.  For a review of these cases, see Strickland v. Alexander, 
153 F. Supp. 3d 1397, 1406–09 (N.D. Ga. 2015).  Consequently, it is likely that this notice is 
required by due process.  
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of other factors, such as layout,65 mode of presentation,66 language,67 and 
ease of use.68  The UWGA contains an employee notice form that was drafted 
with the assistance of a plain-writing group to ensure that employees 
understand the process.69 
The problem of notifying employers about the details of the 
garnishment process is less problematic, as they are likely to be repeat 
players.  Instead, the problem for employers is that the forms (and the process 
itself) are not designed to permit efficient processing.  In today’s world, the 
employer form should be designed to interact with major payroll processing 
systems so that the required employer response can be completed at the touch 
of a button (or two).  Instead, today, most garnishment responses need to be 
completed by hand.70 
D. Limits on the Amount Subject to Garnishment 
The CCPA sets a floor of protection for employees.  Wage garnishment 
cannot begin until an employee’s wages exceed thirty times the federal 
minimum wage71 and cannot take more than twenty-five percent of an 
 
 65  The forms tend not to attend to font size, background colors, type color, shading, 
headings, and other formatting considerations. 
 66  The forms tend to be paper-based in an increasingly electronic-based world. 
 67  Generally, the forms are not equally available to all target audiences, such as those 
with visual disabilities and non-English speakers. 
 68  Even beyond fairness, the forms could add to the system’s efficiency if they were of a 
standard size and format to facilitate electronic use and storage. 
 69  Although the UWGA provides a better notice form, even a perfect one may not be up 
to the task of protecting employees.  In the wage-garnishment context, the Nebraska 
experience hints that employees do not take advantage of available protections even after 
notice.  See infra note 80 and accompanying text.  Although this could be a problem with the 
notice form itself, it is consistent with the broader literature questioning the efficacy of notice 
as a regulatory device.  See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of 
Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011); Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse 
of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089 (2007).  
 70  A related efficiency problem is that the employer response generally needs to be filed 
in court which, if the normal rules apply, requires it to be filed by an attorney rather than a 
payroll-processing employee.  This problem recently arose in Georgia.  See State Bar of Ga., 
Unlicensed Practice of Law Dep’t (UPL), Advisory Opinion No. 2010-1 (Sept. 12, 2011) (a 
non-attorney employee of a garnishee who files an answer to a garnishment in court is 
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law).  In Georgia, the problem was addressed through 
a statutory amendment.  See GA. CODE ANN. § 18-4-12 (West 2018) (an entity’s officer or 
employee who files an answer or payment in court in a garnishment proceeding is not 
engaging in the practice of law).  Since garnishment is a mass-justice system, a requirement 
that attorneys be involved with every court filing greatly increases the cost of the system, with 
little to no gain.  The UWGA solves this problem by having the filings occur between the 
parties rather than through the courts.  UNIF. WAGE GARNISHMENT ACT § 5 cmt. at 12 (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 2016).  
 71  See 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a)(2) (2018).  A problem with this protection is that, because the 
federal minimum wage is amended rarely and not for this purpose, the level of this protection 
tends to be lumpy and unrelated to any public policies related to garnishment.  On lumpiness, 
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employee’s disposable earnings.72  About eighteen states have restrictions 
that mirror the federal limits,73 but the rest of the states incorporate 
variations. 
Three general types of variations currently exist.  First, states may use 
the CCPA model, but simply increase the level of protection—garnishment 
cannot begin until wages exceed forty times the federal minimum wage74 or 
cannot take more than twenty percent of an employee’s disposable 
earnings.75  Second, states can provide special protections for certain classes 
of workers—for example, an exemption providing employees with families 
a higher level of protection.76  Or, third, states can revise the definition of 
“earnings” or “disposable earnings” to provide more protection.77 
The latter two types of enhanced protection represent explicit trade-offs 
between fairness and efficiency.  In Nebraska, for example, a “head of 
family” is entitled to a higher level of protection; only fifteen percent of his 
or her earnings is subject to garnishment, rather than the standard twenty-
five percent.78  This reflects the legislature’s determination that heads of 
families have higher needs and, as a result, should be afforded greater 
 
for example, the minimum wage did not change at all from 1997 to 2006 ($5.15), and then 
jumped more than 40% between 2006 and 2009 ($7.25).  It has not changed since 2009.  See 
History of Federal Minimum Wage Rates Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 1938-2009, 
U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/chart.htm (last visited April 19, 
2019).  This lumpiness has no relationship to the underlying policy of the exemption amount 
in garnishment law, which is to ensure a bare minimum standard of living.  The Uniform Law 
Commission considered including an inflation index to its protections, but ultimately 
determined that it would impose extra costs and be overly complex.  
 72  See § 1673(a)(1).  This is the percentage for debt garnishment.  The limits are different 
for other types of garnishment, such as for support orders or state or federal taxes.  See id. § 
1673(b).  
 73  BRYANT, supra note 34 (listing the restrictions in each state). 
 74  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 571.922(a)(2) (West 2018); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 
32-09.1-03(1)(b) (West 2018).  Sometimes states also increase the floor by using a multiple 
of a state minimum wage that is higher than the federal minimum wage.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. 
PROC. CODE § 706.050(a)(2) (West 2018) (forty times the state minimum wage of $11 per 
hour); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 12-803 (West 2018) (forty-five times the state minimum 
wage of  $8.25 per hour). 
 75  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4913(a) (West 2018) (noting that no more than 
fifteen percent of disposable earnings may be garnished); 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 8127(a)(3) (West 2018) (providing that no more than ten percent of disposable earnings 
may be garnished). 
 76  See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 525.030(2)(1) (West 2018) (providing that no more than 
ten percent of earnings may be garnished for a head of family, but allowing twenty-five 
percent for others); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-1558(1)(c) (West 2018) (providing that no 
more than fifteen percent of earnings may be garnished for a head of family, but allowing 
twenty-five percent for others). 
 77  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-350a(4) (West 2018) (noting that disposable 
earnings do not include “taxes, normal retirement contributions, union dues and initiation fees, 
[or] . . . insurance premiums”). 
 78  NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1558(1). 
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protections.  But, of course, most creditors do not know whether a debtor is 
a “head of family,” since family status is not uniformly included in debt 
instruments and, even if it were, it can change over time.  Consequently, as 
one would expect, most creditors begin the garnishment process with an 
allegation that the debtor is not a head of family, thus permitting the creditor 
to collect more.79  To switch to a “head of family” designation, the employee/
debtor has to file a form requesting a court hearing.  But two things appear 
to be the case in Nebraska.  First, most employees do not file that form, even 
if they are heads of families.  Thus, most of those entitled to the enhanced 
protection do not receive it.80  Second, thousands of court hearings are held 
each year in Nebraska to determine whether debtors are heads of families.81  
Back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate that Nebraska debtors would be 
better off if the special protections for heads of families were eliminated in 
favor of a somewhat better level of protection for everyone.82  Despite these 
kinds of problems, special exemptions for groups that seem to need special 
protection continue to exist.  On paper, if not always in practice, such 
exemptions seem fairer, and have both emotive and political salience. 
Modifying the treatment of “earnings” is the other major type of state 
variation used to provide additional protections to employees.  There are two 
variations.  First, states can expand the “earnings” that are covered by the 
garnishment protections.  The state’s definition must be at least as broad as 
the federal CCPA’s floor of protections.  But a state can sweep additional 
payments into earnings, which entitles an employee to the protections of the 
garnishment statute.  Thus, a state might include an income tax refund as 
earnings even though they are not earnings under the CCPA.83  Including 
income tax refunds as “earnings” would protect most of the payments from 
garnishment.  This can be counter-intuitive: if a payment is “earnings,” in 
rough terms, only twenty-five percent of it can be garnished; on the other 
hand, if the payment is not “earnings,” all of it can be garnished.  Second, 
 
 79  Based on an informal survey of county clerks in eleven of the eighteen counties in 
Nebraska with more than 1,000 garnishments in fiscal year 2017, initial affidavits from 
creditors acknowledge head-of-family status only about one-quarter as often as one would 
expect based on census data.  See Steven L. Willborn, Informal Survey of Nebraska County 
Clerks (Jan. 16, 2019) (unpublished survey) (on file with author). 
 80  Based on the informal survey, less than half of those entitled to the head-of-family 
exemption level actually receive it.  Id. 
 81  Based on the informal survey and the number of debt garnishments in Nebraska (over 
55,000 annually), Nebraska courts hold almost 1,500 hearings annually on this issue.  Id. 
 82  In Nebraska, if the head of family protection (at fifteen percent) was eliminated and 
the creditors were permitted to capture only twenty percent of disposable earnings (instead of 
the current general rate of twenty-five percent), Nebraska’s debtors would net in excess of 
$500,000 annually. 
 83  See Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 652 (1974) (holding that income tax refund is 
not earnings under CCPA). 
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states can expand what can be deducted from “earnings” to arrive at 
“disposable earnings.”  Thus, some states permit union dues or health 
insurance premium payments to be deducted from earnings, even though the 
CCPA does not.84  These extra deductions reduce the base upon which the 
garnishment amount is calculated and thus provide greater protections for 
employees.  Again, states include these additional protections for employees 
because they are viewed as fair.  At the same time, however, they impose 
extra compliance costs on employers. 
The UWGA is officially neutral on whether states should provide 
protections that exceed the minimums of the CCPA and, if so, the form of 
those extra protections.85  But a focus on efficiency would counsel that extra 
protections for employees should be included in state garnishment acts by 
increasing the general levels of protection, rather than by having more finely-
tuned protections.  General protections, such as increasing the base level of 
protection from thirty to forty times the federal minimum wage, would attend 
to the state’s interest in a fairer level of protection while imposing almost no 
extra costs.  On the other hand, bespoke protections, while they can target 
particular groups more narrowly, tend to be much harder and more expensive 
to implement.  The Nebraska experience is that, precisely because they are 
hard to implement, they may even miss their intended target. 
Related issues arise when an employee is subject to multiple 
garnishments.  The limits on garnishment discussed above apply to the total 
amount deductible from all garnishments.86  As a result, multiple 
garnishments require two sets of determinations.  First, what is the priority 
among the garnishments?  As a general matter, debt garnishment falls behind 
other types of garnishments, such as child-support or tax-related 
garnishments.87  Those others must be paid first, and then any amount 
available within the limits can be used for the debt garnishment. Second, how 
should payments for equal-priority debt garnishments be allocated?  There 
are two general options: (1) pay them seriatim, or (2) pay them both a share 
of the available amount.  Both options raise concerns.  Paying creditors 
seriatim can result in a race to the courthouse and requires rules about how 
long the garnishment lasts (e.g., until the first creditor’s debt is paid in full 
or for a set period of time).  Paying both (or all) creditors a share requires 
money to be transferred to more parties and a rule for determining the share 
 
 84  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-350a(4) (West 2018) (excluding union dues 
and health and life insurance premiums from disposable earnings). 
 85  UNIF. WAGE GARNISHMENT ACT § 2 cmt. at 5–6 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2016) (discussing 
“disposable earnings”).  
 86  The limits for types of garnishment other than debt garnishment may be different.  See 
15 U.S.C. § 1673(b); see also supra note 72 and accompanying text.  
 87  See BRYANT, supra note 34, § 8.08.  
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for each creditor (e.g., equal or proportional to the amount of debt).  The 
UWGA opted for equal shared payments without regard to the amount of 
debt, time of filing, or any other factor.88  This avoids the potential game-
playing and complications of seriatim payments.  The equal payments avoid 
the need for complicated rules about how the available amount should be 
allocated. 
Another withholding issue is whether employers can retain a portion of 
the monies as an administrative fee.  Most states currently provide 
administrative fees to employers (thirty-one states), although a substantial 
minority do not (nineteen states).89  Of those that provide for fees, nine states 
have a one-time, up-front fee; eighteen states have some variation of a per-
payment fee; and two states have both an up-front and a per-payment fee.  
Two states have idiosyncratic fee structures.90 
The issue of whether to permit an employer fee is a fairness issue.  The 
employer is an involuntary participant in the collection process, and the 
participation is not costless.  In practice, this fee would ultimately fall on the 
employee,91 but perhaps that is fair since it is the employee who incurred the 
debt and is failing to pay it.  For this reason, the UWGA includes an 
administrative fee for employers and opts for a one-time, up-front fee.92 
A final issue is whether any of the restrictions on garnishment should 
be extended beyond wages.  For example, little would be gained by ensuring 
that an employee receives seventy-five percent of her earnings from an 
employer if the amount could be immediately garnished from the bank when 
 
 88  See UNIF. WAGE GARNISHMENT ACT § 14.  
 89  See BRYANT, supra note 34, § 9.02[A] (listing the state rules for administrative fees). 
 90  See id. 
 91  The total amount deducted from the employee’s pay, including the fee, would have to 
fall within the limits of the exemptions.  In practice, this means that the amount paid to the 
creditor would be less, which would lengthen the period of repayment and result in higher 
interest charges. 
 92  See UNIF. WAGE GARNISHMENT ACT § 5(d)(2).  The fee would be a set amount per 
garnishment, but the UWGA leaves the amount of the fee to the discretion of each state.  Id.  
The UWGA’s comment to the fee provision notes that “a one-time fee can provide the same 
relief from the unwelcome costs of garnishment as per-payment fees if the one-time fee is set 
at a level that approximates the total returns of the multiple-fee alternative.”  Id. cmt. at 13.  
But it identifies two advantages of the one-time fee approach:   
First, it is significantly more efficient both because it only has to be paid 
once and because it is easier to implement.  Second, it is fairer in some 
circumstances.  For example, a large number of payments may be 
required when individual payments are low because debtors have low 
earnings.  Indeed, it is possible in some circumstances, that the fee could 
exceed the amount paid to the creditor to service the debt.  As a result, 
the poorest debtors may often pay the highest fees under a per-payment 
fee schedule.  An up-front fee avoids this possibility. 
Id.  The UWGA contains an appendix that details several changes in the UWGA that would 
be required by a per-payment fee.  Id. at app. A. 
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it is automatically deposited pursuant to the employer’s normal payroll 
practices.93  Although most states provide some type of garnishment 
protection for bank depositors, the nature and scope of the protections vary 
considerably.94  Most of these protections are independent of and 
uncoordinated with the protections for wage garnishment.95  Those drafting 
the UWGA considered extending its protections for wages to bank accounts, 
but ultimately decided against such an extension.96  A separate project on 
bank garnishment is currently under consideration by the Uniform Law 
Commission. 
E. Handling the Money 
At its core, garnishment is about getting debts paid.  So every 
garnishment system must have a process for transferring money from 
employee to creditor.  In Nebraska, for example, when an employer receives 
a garnishment affidavit notifying it of the proceeding and requesting 
information, it begins withholding money from the employee at the next 
paycheck.97  The employer transfers the money to the creditor, however, only 
later when (if) it receives a subsequent order from the court. 
Nebraska’s process for handling the money creates some obvious 
efficiency issues.  For example, sometimes creditors drop the ball after the 
affidavit and never ask the court for an order.  At some point, the employer 
has to ask the court for direction, or simply return the money to the 
 
 93  In addition to undermining garnishment protections, bank garnishment is a factor 
driving people to become unbanked.  Unbanking, which is especially prominent among low-
income persons, makes it difficult to save, obtain credit, and participate fully in the modern 
economy.  See John P. Caskey, Bringing Unbanked Households Into the Banking System, 
CAP. XCHANGE J., Jan. 2002, at 2, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/bringing-unbanked-
households-into-the-banking-system/. 
 94  Thirty-five states currently provide some type of garnishment protection for bank 
depositors.  See CAROLYN CARTER & ROBERT J. HOBBS, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., NO 
FRESH START: HOW STATES LET DEBT COLLECTORS PUSH FAMILIES INTO POVERTY 23–26, 39–
40 (2013), www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-no-fresh-start.pdf. 
 95  Several cases hold that the CCPA’s wage garnishment protections do not extend to 
bank deposits.  See, e.g., Usery v. First Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 586 F.2d 107, 109 (9th Cir. 1978); 
In re Lawrence, 219 B.R. 786, 792–93 (E.D. Tenn. 1998); John O. Melby & Co. Bank v. 
Anderson, 276 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Wis. 1979).  But see MidAmerica Sav. Bank v. Miehe, 438 
N.W.2d 837, 839–40 (Iowa 1989) (holding that earnings that have been garnished maintain 
protection in bank accounts for ninety days if debtor claims exemption and can segregate 
funds); Daugherty v. Central Tr. Co. of Ne. Ohio, 504 N.E.2d 1100, 1102 (Ohio 1986) 
(holding that garnished earnings maintain protection in bank accounts “so long as the source 
of the exempt funds is known or reasonably traceable” (footnote omitted)).  For a case on lack 
of coordination between protections for wage and bank garnishment, see Miller v. Monrean, 
507 P.2d 771, 775 (Alaska 1973) (holding that the Alaska general exemption statute protects 
the first $350 in a bank account so the CCPA protections do not apply). 
 96  See UNIF. WAGE GARNISHMENT ACT § 3(a)–(c)(4).  
 97  See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-1056(1) (West 2018). 
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employee.98  In every case, the employer has to develop and maintain a 
system for holding money that, at the time, is the employee’s, not the 
employer’s. 
The actual transfer of the money also tends to inefficiency.  Until 
recently,99 the employer could cut a check to the creditor and mail it to the 
court, which would then record it and forward it to the creditor.  Sometimes 
large employers would cut one check for all employees subject to 
garnishment in a particular court, and send that check to the court with a list 
of the employees and amounts owing.  Then the court would need to record 
the amounts paid and cut its own check to each individual creditor.  This is 
how Nebraska handles garnishment within its large counties.  In either event, 
the process fails to take advantage of modern payment systems, making it 
slow and subject to error. 
The UWGA has no delay period during which the employer must hold 
the employee’s money on behalf of creditors.  The employer only begins to 
deduct money from an employee’s pay thirty days after receiving the 
garnishment order (to give the employee time to raise objections)100 and, at 
that point, the withheld amount is transferred directly from employer to 
creditor.101  The UWGA authorizes, and hence encourages, electronic 
payments.102 
F. Record-Keeping 
Garnishment records are kept, at least in theory, by multiple parties: the 
court; the creditor; the employer; and the employee.  Record-keeping 
processes raise four issues that do not always cut in the same direction. 
First, which set of records is the “official” one that should be given 
special weight if disputes arise?  If the court maintains records, then that 
would be the official set.  But, of course, the court’s records can be incorrect 
so even they must be subject to challenge.  The same special weight of 
presumptive accuracy could be given to a different record-keeper.  The 
 
 98  A bill was introduced in the Nebraska Unicameral in 2017 to address this problem by 
setting the time limit for holding funds at 60 days.  It was not enacted into law. L.B. 136, 
105th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2017), https://nebraskalegislature.gov/FloorDocs/105/PDF/Intro/ 
LB136.pdf.  
 99  Commendably, Nebraska recently implemented a system to permit electronic 
payments, even though not specifically authorized legislatively.  See State of Nebraska’s 
Garnishment Payment System, NEBRASKA.GOV, http://www.nebraska.gov/demo/ePayments-
Garnishments/two.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2019). 
 100  UNIF. WAGE GARNISHMENT ACT § 7.  
 101  See id. § 8(a) (providing that the employer will send garnished amounts directly to the 
creditor).  
 102  See id. § 5(c)(7) (authorizing payments to be made through any reasonable means 
authorized by the creditor).  
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UWGA, for example, assigns this role to the employer’s records.103  This 
assignment has advantages over court records on other dimensions, such as 
ease of updating and speed of payment.104 
Second, how easy is it to update the records?  Debt garnishment 
involves debt, so interest will accrue and the amount of interest may change 
over time—in fact, it usually does change over time—as payments are larger 
or smaller than expected, or missed.  Similarly, the debtor might make side 
payments on the debt outside of the garnishment process.  Approving and 
recording these changes through the courts entails extra costs, so this 
consideration weighs in favor of making the employer or creditor records the 
official ones.105 
Third, how accessible are the records?  Accessibility is most important 
to the parties, of course; the employee needs to know how much he or she 
owes, the creditor needs to know how much is owed, and the court needs to 
know when to terminate the case.  But there may also be public interest in 
the records by outsiders, such as participants in the credit markets and policy 
researchers.  Any recording system could satisfy the former function, 
assuming an obligation exists to share records amongst the parties,106 but a 
court recording system would perform the latter system best.107  So another 
consideration is the importance of public accessibility to wage garnishment 
information. 
Fourth, to what extent, if any, does record-keeping slow the payment 
process?  A common procedure requires the employer to send the money to 
the court, which records it and then forwards it to the creditor.  With an 
electronic payment system, that process would not necessarily create any 
more delay than a direct-payment system.  But with a paper system, there 
would be delay. 
 
 103  See id. § 8(f).  The UWGA provides employees and creditors with rights of access to 
the employer’s records analogous to the access that would be available through a court-
preferred recording system.  See id.  
 104  See id. § 8(d) (allowing records to be updated through notice from creditor to 
employer). 
 105  See id.  One commenter noted that this reminded him of foxes and henhouses.  Less 
snarkily, this raises a monitoring issue.  Removing courts from the process is likely to have 
little adverse effect on monitoring.  Because garnishment is mass justice, courts tend to do 
little monitoring when they are involved in the process; they tend to assume a ministerial role 
rather than a regulatory one.  At the same time, although there is one fox in this scenario (the 
creditor), both the employer and the employee would prefer that the employee retain as much 
of her wages as possible.  They are likely to be the effective monitors, whether or not the court 
is involved. 
 106  See UNIF. WAGE GARNISHMENT ACT § 8(c)–(f). 
 107  Although it is true that a court filing system could, in theory, facilitate public access 
better than other recording systems, in practice, public access to information about 
garnishment is very limited.  See Hynes, supra note 43, at 607 n.22 (“[T]he overwhelming 
majority of states do not publicly report data on the use of their collections proceedings.”).  
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Most current garnishment processes balance these considerations in 
favor of a court recording system, although the processes arrived there 
through historical inertia rather than deliberative choice.  The UWGA 
balances them by eschewing judicial recording of payments and opting 
instead in favor of the employer’s records.  Payments are made directly from 
the employer to the creditor, and the employer’s records are presumptively 
accurate.108  The general balance was that ease of updating and speed of 
payment were present repeatedly in every case, while the other 
considerations rarely arose.  That is, challenges to the records were unusual 
and generally easily resolved, and public interest in the records was rare.109 
G. Sanctions for Employers and Creditors 
Garnishment statutes generally provide sanctions for employers who 
fail to comply.110  Much less frequently, they contain sanctions for creditors 
who abuse the process, relying instead on general rules prohibiting abuse of 
judicial process.  Interestingly (perhaps), no sanctions are necessary for the 
party most interested in the proceeding—the employee/debtor.  As an 
involuntary participant, he or she has no options that need to be influenced 
by sanctions. 
Employer sanctions can be draconian.  Some states impose penalties or 
hold employers liable for the entire debt if they fail to comply with a 
garnishment order.111  This seems odd for a number of practical reasons: it 
imposes a heavy penalty for what can be a minor violation; it arbitrarily 
releases some employees from their debts; and it encourages creditors to look 
for minor employer defaults rather than to make the system work smoothly.  
It also seems odd theoretically.112  A better system would be more focused 
on making the system work.  The UWGA does this by calibrating the size of 
 
 108  See UNIF. WAGE GARNISHMENT ACT § 8. 
 109  See Hynes, supra note 43, at 607 (“Surprisingly, this is the first article in thirty years 
to carefully examine garnishment statistics.” (footnote omitted)).  
 110  See BRYANT, supra note 34, § 9.03–.53 subsec. 5 (listing employer sanctions for each 
state). 
 111  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Miller, 879 N.E.2d 292, 305 (Ill. 2007) (upholding 
$1,172,100 judgment against employer based mostly on penalties for failure to pay 
garnishment amounts); cf. Smith v. Smith, 165 S.W.3d 285, 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) 
(reversing, on procedural grounds, an order that employer pay entire underlying debt of more 
than $80,000 for failure to respond appropriately to garnishment).  
 112  In theory, penalties should be slightly more than the benefit an employer would obtain 
by not complying with a garnishment order, adjusted upwards if the non-compliance is hard 
to detect.  See WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 15, at 1172–73.  For garnishments, the employer 
receives only a small benefit by refusing to comply—basically, the administrative cost of 
complying with the order.  (The money that has to be paid, after all, is the employee’s, not the 
employer’s.)  And the probability of detection is close to 100%; the creditor is watching 
closely.  Thus, in theory, employer penalties for non-compliance should be very low, the 
opposite of draconian. 
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penalties to the type of employer default113 and, even then, imposing those 
penalties only after notice and continued failure of the employer to 
comply.114 
Creditor sanctions are underdeveloped despite considerable evidence 
that some creditors abuse the process.115  The challenge is to separate out 
truly bad-actor creditors.  In theory, courts should be able to do this with 
standard abuse-of-process tools.  If creditors are filing suits without adequate 
evidence of debt or abusing the process in other ways, courts can sanction 
using their inherent contempt powers.  But garnishment is mass justice, and 
debtors tend to be unrepresented.116  The UWGA justifiably117 calls for more 
severe sanctions against creditors than employers,118 but, like the employer 
sanctions, they are designed to encourage compliance rather than to punish.  
Compliance is encouraged by requiring notice before any sanctions are 
imposed, and making the penalties avoidable and calibrated.119  This 
calibration and focus on compliance rather than punishment are not possible 
if a court’s only options are its general contempt powers. 
H. Protections for Employees Subject to Garnishment 
Garnishments are an annoyance for employers.  Thus, they might be 
tempted to just fire the employee and get rid of the problem.  The CCPA 
provides some protection for employees.  It prohibits an employer from 
discharging an employee for a single garnishment.120  The UWGA expands 
this protection121 by prohibiting any adverse action by an employer “because 
 
 113  See UNIF. WAGE GARNISHMENT ACT § 16.  
 114  See id. § 15.  
 115  See CFPB Takes Action to Halt Illegal Debt Collection Practices by Lawsuit Mill and 
Debt Buyer, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Apr. 25, 2016), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-halt-illegal-debt-
collection-practices-lawsuit-mill-and-debt-buyer (reporting on fines for massive 
improprieties in collecting consumer debt); Ray Rivera, Suit Claims Fraud by New York Debt 
Collectors, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/31/nyregion/31 
debt.html (reporting lawsuit against New York debt collectors for improprieties, including 
“sewer service”).  
 116  See Paul Kiel, So Sue Them: What We’ve Learned About the Debt Collection Lawsuit 
Machine, PROPUBLICA (May 5, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/so-sue-them-what-
weve-learned-about-the-debt-collection-lawsuit-machine (reporting that over ninety percent 
of debtors in collection cases are unrepresented). 
 117  Sanctions against creditors should be more severe because creditors benefit more from 
non-compliance than employers and because improprieties are much less likely to be 
discovered.  See supra note 112. 
 118  See UNIF. WAGE GARNISHMENT ACT § 17(a), (f) (authorizing penalties and attorney’s 
fees against non-complying creditors without limiting other possible remedies).  
 119  See id. § 17(b), (e) (permitting sanctions only after notice and continued non-
compliance by creditor, and permitting court to waive penalties for good cause).  
 120  See 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (2018). 
 121  The UWGA’s provisions would also clarify some areas where protections under the 
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of a garnishment or attempted garnishment.”122  Thus, it is broader than the 
CCPA because it provides protection regardless of the number of 
garnishments, for both actual and attempted garnishments, and from all types 
of employer adverse actions (not only discharges).  The UWGA also 
provides an enforcement mechanism by applying an enacting state’s 
procedures for enforcing anti-discrimination laws to alleged violations of 
this provision.123 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Garnishment affects millions of mostly middle-class workers each year.  
Despite its ubiquity, garnishment operates in the shadows.  The last major 
initiative to address its unfairness and inefficiencies occurred in 1968.  As 
this Article demonstrates, if full attention were to be paid to garnishment, 
significant improvements could be made in both fairness and efficiency.  
And since the efficiency gains would be multiplied millions of times each 
year, the total savings would be huge.  The UWGA is an invitation to the 
states to reconsider their garnishment procedures.  It provides a 
comprehensive approach to modernizing the wage garnishment system, and 
making it much fairer and more efficient. 
 
 
CCPA have been uncertain.  See, e.g., Donovan v. S. Cal. Gas Co., 715 F.2d 1405, 1406, 1408 
(9th Cir. 1983) (holding that an employee could not be discharged, even though employer 
received garnishment notices from two different creditors, because employee secured release 
of second creditor before any wages were withheld); Brennan v. Kroger Co., 513 F.2d 961, 
963–64 (7th Cir. 1975) (finding that an employee could not be discharged when two 
garnishment notices were pending because the state’s garnishment priorities system held the 
second garnishment in abeyance, thus there could not be a dismissal until the wages were 
actually withheld on the second garnishment). 
 122  UNIF. WAGE GARNISHMENT ACT § 19(a).  
 123  Id. § 19(b). 
